We will be discussing three kinds of
explosions.
- Detonation of an explosive device
producing blast or shock waves
- Vapor cloud and dust cloud
explosions in an unconfined or partially confined
space
- Explosion produced by sudden
rupture of a container under pressure
Sometimes explosions are classified
as (1) thermal explosions and (2) non-thermal
explosions. A thermal explosion is one which burns
suddenly (detonates) resulting in a violent expansion of
gases with great disruptive force and a loud noise. The
detonation of an explosive device made up of ammonium
nitrate/fuel oil is an example of a thermal explosion. A
non-thermal explosion describes a sudden bursting
because of buildup of pressure within a container. An
example is the filling of a tank with air under
pressure, and the tank suddenly bursts producing an
explosion. Detonation of an Explosive Device
An explosive device involves the use
of a solid or liquid that explodes if ignited, shocked,
or subjected to heat or friction. Examples are
nitroglycerine, ammonium nitrate/fuel oil mixtures,
PETN, TNT, dynamite, lead azide, RDX, gunpowder, and
dynamite.
Whether something will explode
requires investigation on a case-by-case basis. Some
materials such as copper azide will detonate at the
slightest shock or movement whereas others such as TNT
or RDX may require another explosive (called a primary
explosive, or a blasting cap) to detonate the material.
There is no easy way of predicting whether a particular
material is explosive; a case-by-case investigation is
required. However if an oxidizing material (e.g.
ammonium perchlorate, potassium permanganate, ammonium
nitrate, etc.) can be placed in intimate contact with a
fuel source (almost any organic material which burns)
this is a basic recipe for an explosive material. If the
oxidizing part can be incorporated into the molecule
itself (e.g. nitric acid plus glycerin to yield
nitroglycerine), a powerful explosive is produced.
Another example is trinitrotoluene, also called
2,4,6-trinitrotoluene, or “TNT” for short, which is
manufactured from toluene (toluene is the fuel part of
the molecule, three “nitro-” groups are the oxidizing
part). If certain combustible metal powders such as
aluminum can also be mixed in with the material, the
explosive capability may be enhanced. Many explosive
chemicals have nitrogen in the form of nitrate (a
nitrogen atom linked to three oxygen atoms) or nitro- (a
nitrogen atom linked to two oxygen atoms) or azide (two
nitrogen atoms linked together) incorporated as part of
the organic molecule.
Dynamite is a detonating explosive
containing a liquid explosive ingredient (usually
nitroglycerine or a similar organic nitrate ester or
both) that is uniformly mixed with an adsorbent material
such as wood pulp and usually contains materials such as
nitrocellulose, sodium and/or ammonium nitrate
(definition from United States 40 CFR 173.59).
All of these fall into the general
category of thermal explosions.
One of the current technological
challenges is to build non-evasive equipment able to
detect ‘signatures’ of explosive materials that might be
in airport baggage or in vehicles.
When an explosive material detonates,
the violence and speed of the reactions taking place
produce a blast or shock waves (a thin shell of highly
compressed air which rapidly expands in all directions
from the point that the explosion is initiated). The
speed of the wave can exceed the speed of sound. The
strength of the wave is measured in terms of
overpressures, or peak overpressures (maximum pressure
in the wave in excess of normal atmospheric pressure).
The blast effects of one explosive,
TNT, have been very well studied. All other explosives
are compared to TNT in terms of TNT equivalents. Even
nuclear explosions are rated in terms of TNT
equivalents.
The following equation relates the
distance from the point of a ground-level explosion to
peak overpressure.
X = M1/3 exp[3.5031
–0.7241ln(P) + 0.0398 (ln(P))2 ]
here, X = Distance in feet to a given
overpressure P
M = TNT equivalent mass, lbs
P = overpressure, psi (psi = pounds
per square inch)
This equation is from Lees, F.
(1980), Loss Prevention in the Process
Industries, Butterworth Press. It is the equation
used in the ARCHIE model and also used by EPA in Risk
Management studies (EPA uses P = 1 psi). The equation is
also used in the PEAC tool in predicting Protective
Action Distances. The equation is valid for an explosion
at ground level at 20°C ignoring any redirection of the
overpressure by structures and terrain. If the explosion
occurred up in the air (unconfined in all directions),
the distance X would be reduced by a factor of 1.26.
The expected damage that is expected
to occur for a given overpressure is listed in table 1.
p class=MsoNormal>Table 1. Explosion Overpressure
Damage Estimates
|
Overpressure, psi |
Expected Damage |
|
0.04 |
Very loud noise (143 dB); sonic
boom glass failures |
|
0.1 |
Breakage of small windows under
strain |
|
0.15 |
Typical pressure of glass
failure |
|
0.30 |
10% of windows broken
|
|
0.5 |
Windows shattered, limited
minor damage to house structures |
|
0.7 |
Upper limit for reversible
effects on humans |
|
1.0 |
Partial demolition of houses;
corrugated metal panels fail and buckle; skin
lacerations from flying glass |
|
2.0 |
Partial collapse of walls and
roofs of houses |
|
2.4 |
Eardrum rupture of exposed
populations |
|
2.5 |
Threshold for significant human
lethality |
|
3.0 |
Steel frame building distorted
and pulled away from foundation |
|
5.0 |
Wooden utility poles snapped
|
|
10 |
Probable total building
collapse. Lungs hemorrhage |
|
20 |
Total destruction. 99% fatality
due to direct blast effects
|
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (ATF) has published (once available on line at
www.atf.treas.gov/pub/fire-explo_pub/i54001.htm,
now must be ordered at the address given at the ATF
website) Lethal Air Blast Range and Minimum Evacuation
Distance values for vehicles carrying explosives as in a
terrorist threat. Table 2 compares these distances with
the overpressure formula listed above, assuming that the
explosive is TNT or equivalent. A possible explosive
used by a terrorist is ANFO, prepared by soaking
ammonium nitrate prills in fuel oil (94% ammonium
nitrate, 6% fuel oil) and detonated by an high explosive
booster or a blasting cap. ANFO has an explosive power
(by weight) approaching that of TNT, or even greater if
the ANFO is enhanced with aluminum powder.
Table 2. Comparison of Formula
Calculations with ATF Distances for Vehicles Carrying
Explosives
|
Vehicle |
Explosive Capacity, lbs |
ATF Lethal Air Blast Range, ft.
|
Equation calc. At P = 3 psi
|
ATF Minimum Evac. Dist, ft.
|
Equation calc. At P = 0.12 psi.
|
|
Compact Sedan |
500 |
100 |
125 |
1500 |
1464 |
|
Full Size Sedan |
1000 |
125 |
157 |
1750 |
1840 |
|
Cargo Van |
4000 |
200 |
250 |
2750 |
2928 |
|
14-ft Box Van |
10000 |
300 |
339 |
3750 |
3974 |
|
Fuel Truck |
30000 |
450 |
489 |
6500 |
5753 |
|
Semi-Trailer |
60000 |
600 |
615 |
7000 |
7220 |
At P = 0.15 psi, glass failure may
occur. At 0.3 psi, 10% of the windows in buildings may
be broken. The upper limit for reversible effects on
humans is at P = 0.7 psi. At P = 2.4 psi, eardrum
rupture may occur. P= 2.5 to 10 and higher is in the
range of lethality to humans. At P = 3 psi, a steel
frame building may become distorted and pulled away from
its foundation. At P = 10 psi, there will be probable
total building destruction. There are differences of
opinion in the literature as to what overpressure should
be used for a Protection Action Distance. The 0.12 psi
number is suggested based on the ATF information.
In the PEAC tool, both the ATF
information and Protective Action Distances based on
overpressure calculations are
displayed.
EXAMPLE : Terrorist with small
package containing an explosive
A terrorist has a small package,
which appears to measure approximately 4x3x5 inches. It
could be a hoax, but what are the consequences if the
package contains a plastic bonded explosive and it
detonates?
Using the PEAC tool. The PEAC
user selects “plastic bonded explosive” and the package
dimensions. The PEAC tool internally calculates a TNT
equivalent (about 6 lbs). The user enters several
overpressure values, including 0.12 psig (minimum safe
evacuation distance), 1 psig (possible serious injury
due to flying glass and missiles; partial demolition of
houses), and 5 psig (nearly complete destruction of
houses; vehicle demolished). The PEAC tool calculates
internally 320 feet, 60 feet, and 20 feet for the
respective overpressures using the equation listed
above.
Discussion. If the incident
occurs in a bus, the explosion may blow apart the bus
possibly killing most people aboard and blowing out the
windows of nearby vehicles. If the incident occurs in a
shopping mall, shrapnel may fall at a distance up to
about 320 feet and with serious injury at 60 feet. A
terrorist would probably position himself or place the
explosive for maximum possible impact (as in a bus, an
aircraft, near a fuel storage tank, or corridor where
many people are present), which must be taken into
consideration.
Vapor Cloud or Dust Cloud
Explosions in an Unconfined or Partially Confined
Space
By unconfined or partially confined
space we mean out in the open or inside a building or a
silo as opposed to inside a tank or some other sealed
container.
You have seen numbers, “Lower
Explosive Limit” and “Upper Explosive Limit listed with
many chemicals. For example, propane has a lower
explosive limit of 2.7% and an upper explosive limit of
9.5%. If the concentration of propane in air is between
2.7 and 9.5% by volume, and there is an ignition source
(e.g. a spark generated by friction, a lighted
cigarette) an explosion will occur. If the concentration
of propane is less than 2.7%, the mixture is too lean
for the propane to ignite. If the concentration is above
9.5%, the mixture is too rich.
Last month we talked about
concentration fluctuations in the air resulting from air
circulation patterns. Even though the average
concentration measured might be outside the explosive
range, localized concentrations may be within the range,
resulting in detonation if a ignition source occurred.
Many materials will self-ignite if
heated to a high enough temperature. This is the
auto-ignition temperature . This temperature is listed
in the PEAC tool for many chemicals. This is of
particular concern if there is a nearby fire, and the
radiant heat from this fire heats nearby structures and
their chemical contents. The heat can volatilize the
chemicals which may self ignite without the original
fire coming into contact with the chemicals.
Two things may happen when the vapor
cloud or dust cloud is ignited. The first is a vapor
cloud explosion. This may be followed (almost
instantaneously) by a fire as the flammable vapor burns.
It is common practice in a vapor cloud explosion to
express the energy released as a TNT-equivalent charge,
and then utilize the overpressure data for TNT
explosions. The overpressure data from TNT explosions
are used to relate overpressure to distance from the
vapor cloud explosion. However, only a fraction of the
energy in the chemical contributes to the explosion. The
rest of the energy may contribute to an accompanying
fireball. The equation for calculating the equivalent
mass of TNT is
M = mc [ Hc/
1155] Y
where M = TNT equivalent mass, lbs
Hc = lower heat of
combustion of chemical, kcal/kg
Y = yield factor (the fraction of the
mass of chemical that contributes to the explosion)
The number 1155 is the heat of
detonation of TNT in kcal/kg.
(kcal/kg = kilocalories per
kilogram).
The heat of combustion is a number
that can be looked up in a reference table for a
particular chemical. By convention the reference tables
in chemistry handbooks usually give the “high value” for
the heat of combustion and must be corrected to give the
lower value (this is a simple mathematical correction).
For example, the lower heat of combustion for ethylene
is 11,272 kcal/kg, and the high value is 12,022 kcal/kg
(from the 4th edition of the Chemical
Engineer’s Handbook).
The yield factor is probably the
biggest unknown. If we have an explosive device,
essentially 100% of the material contributes to the
explosion. For vapor cloud explosions, the numbers are
much less, usually Y is between 0.02 and 0.20 (2 to 20%
of the energy in the chemical contributes to the
explosion). The U.S. EPA when performing Risk Management
calculations suggest using Y = 0.1 for all chemical
forming vapor clouds, but the ARCHIE model assigns
different yield factors for different chemicals.
Once the mass of equivalent TNT is
calculated, the equation relating distance to
overpressure can be used. The ARCHIE model cites a
Health and Safety Executive board (England)
recommendation that the overpressure P should be less
than 15 psi when using the equation to calculate
distances.
This is not the only methodology
available for computing vapor cloud explosions. A
discussion of the TNO yellow book model is in J. R.
Taylor’s book titled “Risk Analysis for Process Plant
Pipelines and Transport”, 1994, published by E&FN
Spon, London (England). The TNO yellow book model was
developed by the Bureau of Industrial Safety of the
Netherlands, and originally published in
1980
EXAMPLE : Ethylene oxide gas escapes from
a cylinder into a room
The entire contents of a 15-lb (net
weight) 4B240 cylinder of ethylene oxide escapes into a
room overnight. The room is closed and the ventilation
system is turned off. No other flammable liquids or
gases are in the room . The room measures 10 by 15 feet
and is 9 feet high. The temperature is 68oF
(20oC). What are the consequences if the
escaped gas ignites?
Discussion: From the PEAC
tool, ethylene oxide is seen to have a boiling point of
51oF, a molecular weight of 44.1, a lower
explosive limit of 3%, and an upper explosive limit of
100%. There are also toxicity concerns as ethylene oxide
has an IDLH of 800 ppm (parts per million). The same
information can be looked up in the NIOSH pocket guide
to chemical hazards. Ethylene oxide is heavier than air
(air has an average molecular weight of 29) so at least
initially the escaping gas will settle close to the
floor. Eventually the gas will diffuse and mix
throughout the room. The volume of the room is 1350
cubic feet. The volume of 15 lbs of ethylene oxide at
68oF is 131 cubic feet. If all of the
ethylene oxide remained inside of the room, the volume
percent of ethylene oxide in the room could reach 9.7%
(131 x 100% / 1350). This number is well above the lower
explosive limit.
Ethylene oxide is a molecule that
contains its own oxygen. The “fuel” and “oxidant” are
part of the same molecule. It is explosive even at a
vapor concentration of 100%.
The ARCHIE model suggests using a
yield factor of 0.19 (Y = 0.19) for ethylene oxide in
vapor/gas explosions. The heat of combustion of ethylene
oxide is 6380 kcal/kg (from the CHRIS Manual). The
numbers work out such that 15 pounds of ethylene oxide
in an explosive gas mixture is roughly equivalent to 15
lbs of TNT.
Of course it can be argued that some
ethylene oxide will seep under the door or through vents
so the amount explosive mixture inside the room may be
less than 15 pounds. Also the algorithm for TNT
overpressure is known to over-predict the overpressure
at very close distances to the center of the vapor cloud
explosion. But we are looking at the worst case.
Using the PEAC tool, distances
corresponding to 0.12 psi, 1 psi, and 5 psi overpressure
are calculated for 15 lbs of TNT. These are 455, 82, and
28 feet. The force of the explosion could knock down the
walls of the room. There could be serious injury from
flying debris at 82 feet. The calculations predict a
minimum safe evacuation distance of about 455 feet.
Because of uncertainties of how the blast/shock waves
may be directed in the building and to the outside, the
entire building probably should be evacuated, and
probably an additional safety factor for evacuation
outside the building.
Example: Case Study of
an ethylene mixture vapor cloud explosion in Texas
In an accident in Pasadena, Texas,
85,000 lbs of a mixture containing primarily ethylene
was released through a valve at 700 psi producing a
vapor cloud ignited. The damage produced by the
explosion was equivalent to 10 tons of TNT. How does
this accident compare with results predicted by the
ARCHIE model?
Discussion: Ten tons of TNT
produces approximately 5 psi overpressure at a distance
of about 320 feet which was consistent with the damage
which occurred. The ARCHIE model suggests a yield factor
of 0.06 for ethylene. The CHRIS manual uses 11,272 kg/kg
for the heat of combustion of ethylene. Using the
formula for TNT equivalents, 85000 lbs (42.5 tons) of
ethylene is equivalent to 25 tons of TNT. Apparently
only a little less than half the ethylene mixture
contributed to the vapor cloud
explosion.
Explosion produced by sudden
rupture of a container under pressure
An over-pressurized container can
explode even without involvement of a combustible or
explosive material. The pressurized vessel can be filled
with air or some other inert gas; it does not have to be
filled with a combustible gas or flammable vapor. Also a
nearly empty pressurized container of gas can be of a
more of an explosion hazard than a container nearly
filled with liquid that ruptures at the same pressure. A
sudden rupture of a container under pressure is an
example of a non-thermal explosion, but a secondary
thermal explosion can occur if the escaping container
contents are flammable and ignite.
A BLEVE (Boiling Liquid
Expanding Vapor Explosion) occurs
when a liquid that is contained under pressure and at a
temperature significantly above its normal (atmospheric)
boiling point is suddenly released from the container
(as in a container rupture). When this happens the
liquid vaporizes almost instantaneously and expands to
several times its original volume with explosive force.
If the BLEVE involves a flammable liquid or a liquefied
flammable gas, the initial explosion often will be
followed by the instantaneous ignition of the released
vapors, resulting in a massive fireball and increased
explosive force.
BLEVEs have been known to hurl debris
weighing a hundred pounds or more for more than a
half-mile from the explosion. There can be a trail of
flaming vapor as a portion of the exploded tank or
container flies through the air. The blast wave from a
BLEVE can destroy structures several hundred feet from
the incident. These incidents makes BLEVEs particularly
dangerous.
Let us recap. Several things happen
here:
·
There is an initial pressurized tank or
container failure, which may produce an initial
explosion.
·
If the tank or container contained a
pressurized liquid which is normally a gas under ambient
temperatures, the sudden release of pressure caused by
tank failure may result in a BLEVE. The secondary
explosion from the BLEVE can destroy nearby structures
and can hurl debris far from the tank location.
·
If the BLEVE involves a flammable liquid
or liquefied flammable gas, there can be a massive
fireball and increased explosive force.
Liquefied natural gas and propane are
common examples of a liquefied flammable gas.
What can cause failure of a
pressurized container, and possible resulting BLEVE?
Pressurized vessels used in industry
should contain safety valves, or pressure release
valves, designed to vent excessive pressure before
vessel failure occurs. But sometimes pressure can
buildup suddenly, or a nearby explosion takes place, or
there may be direct flame impingement above the liquid
level of the tank causing the tank metal to fail.
Two situations that can cause initial
failure of a tank is (1) buildup of pressure inside the
tank because of fire impinging on the tank, and (2)
failure of a tank because of shrapnel damage from a
nearby explosion.
Example: BLEVE at an Illinois
refinery in 1984 killing 17 people.
A propane tank associated with
monoethanolamine absorber tower failed at 200 psi and
100oF at an Illinois refinery. The explosion
and ensuing fireball killed 17 people including 10
members of a standby fire brigade, which had been
earlier called to the site when an operator observed a
6-inch crack in the absorber tower. It was later
determined that a weld in the propane vessel shell
catastrophically failed due to inadequate heat treatment
following a weld repair made ten years earlier.
(reference: S.W. Haines, Workshop:
Preventing Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions,
International Conference and Workshop on Modeling and
Mitigating the Consequences of Accidental Releases of
Hazardous Materials, Sept. 26-29, 1995, New Orleans,
LA, presented in a book [page 87] published by American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, N.Y., N.Y.; the
Pasadena Texas , ethylene explosion example was also
cited from the same book [page 966]).